Disclosed weakness · no CVE recorded
OpenClaw could attach private device images to a chat reply
OpenClaw · OpenClaw · paired-node media
First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint
Summary
An agent inspecting a paired device could send its image to a chat, including a group, when the requested answer was text only.
Severity and exploitation evidence
No CVSS score recorded in this review.
Exploitation not established: The upstream sources document the behavior and correction. They identify no malicious use.
Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.
How the weakness works
The reply system treated inspected images as attachments authorized for delivery.
Conditions required
A session with paired-device access inspects a photo, camera image or screen.
Potential impact
The recipient chat could receive visual information the operator intended only for inspection.
Affected versions and configurations
The upstream report identifies the affected behavior without specifying a complete version range.
Fix and mitigation status
The 2026.11.4 stable release includes this issue-specific correction.
Practical next steps
Deploy the correction and review prior chat attachments where devices handled sensitive information.
Operating lesson
Require a separate decision to send media an assistant can inspect.
Evidence and limits
Earlier browser screenshot reports concern another tool. The paired-device disclosure is dated separately.
Sources
- OpenClaw · fix(nodes): keep paired-node photos and screenshots private by default
Primary source ·
- OpenClaw 2026.11.4 stable release notes
Primary source ·