Disclosed weakness · no CVE recorded

OpenClaw HTTP history could exceed an ID member’s permissions

OpenClaw · OpenClaw · HTTP session history

First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint

Summary

An ID member could read session history through HTTP that the member’s role denied through RPC.

Severity and exploitation evidence

No CVSS score recorded in this review.

Exploitation not established: The reviewed sources describe a correction or controlled reproduction; malicious exploitation against users is not established.

Exploitation evidence source

Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.

How the weakness works

The history client projection dropped the ID principal and used the linked local profile’s broader role.

Conditions required

An OpenClaw ID member is linked to a local profile with stronger permissions and uses the affected HTTP surface.

Potential impact

Unauthorized reading of session messages through JSON or streaming history.

Affected versions and configurations

The reviewed sources do not establish a complete affected-release range.

Fix and mitigation status

2026.11.10-beta.1 contains the correction and is a prerelease. A stable corrected release is unverified.

Practical next steps

Restrict the affected HTTP surface or avoid linking restricted ID members to more privileged local profiles until a corrected build is deployed.

Operating lesson

Preserve the authenticated principal and its permission ceiling across every transport and cookie handoff.

Evidence and limits

The original public PR is November 16, preceding the November 19 beta release. Tagged beta production code retains openclawIdPrincipal; the same reviewed stable 2026.11.5 files omit that projection. Maintainer checks used an isolated compiled Gateway; deployed-service and physical-device behavior were not independently tested.

Sources