Disclosed weakness · no CVE recorded

Obot could bind a victim’s MCP OAuth account to the user who sent a sign-in link

Obot · Obot Platform · MCP gateway

First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint

Summary

An attacker could start MCP OAuth sign-in and have another user complete it, linking the victim’s upstream account to the attacker.

Severity and exploitation evidence

High · 8.7/10 · CVSS 3.1. Severity source.

Exploitation not established: The reviewed sources establish the weakness or a controlled demonstration; malicious exploitation against users is not established.

Exploitation evidence source

Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.

How the weakness works

The callback stored upstream credentials for the initiator without consistently checking that the completing Obot user was the same person.

Conditions required

The attacker has an Obot account allowed to use an OAuth-protected remote MCP server; a signed-in victim follows the attacker’s authorization link.

Potential impact

The attacker can call that server’s tools with the victim’s upstream account for the token and refresh-token lifetime.

Affected versions and configurations

>= 0.8.0, <= 0.28.1.

Fix and mitigation status

0.28.2 fixes this issue.

Practical next steps

Upgrade to 0.28.2 and revoke upstream OAuth grants suspected of being linked through an attacker’s sign-in flow.

Operating lesson

Bind OAuth initiation, callback and token ownership to the same authenticated principal.

Evidence and limits

The complete advisory was published November 20, after the November 19 release. The maintainer assigns the CVSS score. No CVE is assigned in the reviewed advisory. Tagged production code contains the named correction. The victim need not be allowed that MCP server in Obot. Prior upstream consent can remove an additional prompt. Obot account sessions and API keys are not exposed by this issue; PKCE alone does not establish user identity.

Sources