Disclosed weakness · no CVE recorded

Atlassian MCP could fetch attachments and apply TLS settings outside the intended site

mcp-atlassian maintainers · mcp-atlassian · Jira and Confluence MCP server

First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint

Summary

HTTP clients could receive an attachment response from another destination, and a certificate-verification exception could follow a request to an unintended host.

Severity and exploitation evidence

Medium · numeric CVSS score not recorded. Severity source.

Exploitation not established: The maintainer reports an internal audit finding. The advisory identifies no malicious use.

Exploitation evidence source

Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.

How the weakness works

The attachment target and operator TLS exemptions were insufficiently tied to the authenticated Atlassian origin. Caller-supplied configurations also omitted some operator policies.

Conditions required

An HTTP deployment accepts a caller-supplied Atlassian URL and token. Impact depends on reachable hosts and configured TLS exceptions.

Potential impact

An internal service response could be exposed, or a request to an unintended origin could omit certificate verification.

Affected versions and configurations

Before 0.24.5.

Fix and mitigation status

0.24.5.

Practical next steps

Upgrade to 0.24.6 or later. Restrict allowed domains to approved Atlassian hosts and keep certificate verification enabled.

Operating lesson

Bind attachment destinations, TLS exemptions and operator policy to each authenticated request.

Evidence and limits

The maintainer traced this issue to an internal audit and published the patch and advisory November 16. The advisory provides a severity label without a numeric score.

Sources