Disclosed weakness · no CVE recorded
Atlassian MCP could fetch attachments and apply TLS settings outside the intended site
mcp-atlassian maintainers · mcp-atlassian · Jira and Confluence MCP server
First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint
Summary
HTTP clients could receive an attachment response from another destination, and a certificate-verification exception could follow a request to an unintended host.
Severity and exploitation evidence
Medium · numeric CVSS score not recorded. Severity source.
Exploitation not established: The maintainer reports an internal audit finding. The advisory identifies no malicious use.
Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.
How the weakness works
The attachment target and operator TLS exemptions were insufficiently tied to the authenticated Atlassian origin. Caller-supplied configurations also omitted some operator policies.
Conditions required
An HTTP deployment accepts a caller-supplied Atlassian URL and token. Impact depends on reachable hosts and configured TLS exceptions.
Potential impact
An internal service response could be exposed, or a request to an unintended origin could omit certificate verification.
Affected versions and configurations
Before 0.24.5.
Fix and mitigation status
0.24.5.
Practical next steps
Upgrade to 0.24.6 or later. Restrict allowed domains to approved Atlassian hosts and keep certificate verification enabled.
Operating lesson
Bind attachment destinations, TLS exemptions and operator policy to each authenticated request.
Evidence and limits
The maintainer traced this issue to an internal audit and published the patch and advisory November 16. The advisory provides a severity label without a numeric score.
Sources
- mcp-atlassian public correction
Primary source ·
- mcp-atlassian 0.24.5 release notes
Primary source ·
- mcp-atlassian advisory GHSA-cvhg-qx9x-fv7g
Primary source ·