Disclosed weakness · no CVE recorded

LiteLLM callers could redirect Vertex work beyond the administrator’s project or region

LiteLLM · LiteLLM proxy · Vertex model calls, live sessions and RAG ingest

First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint

Summary

A virtual-key holder could override the administrator’s selected Vertex project or region while using the proxy’s Google credentials.

Severity and exploitation evidence

No CVSS score recorded in this review.

Exploitation not established: The reviewed sources describe a correction or controlled reproduction; malicious exploitation against users is not established.

Exploitation evidence source

Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.

How the weakness works

Client fields were allowed to replace deployment or default target settings without the intended per-deployment opt-in.

Conditions required

A caller has an affected virtual key and the proxy’s Google credentials can access the selected destination.

Potential impact

Work could move outside the intended project or region and consume the proxy’s authorized Google resources. Google IAM still bounds access; the report includes provider rejections for unauthorized projects.

Affected versions and configurations

The reviewed upstream report does not establish a complete affected-release range.

Fix and mitigation status

1.111.0-rc.1 contains the correction and remains a prerelease. A stable fix was not independently verified.

Practical next steps

Apply the issue-specific patch or evaluate the release candidate; retain administrator-defined project and region pins unless caller selection is intentionally authorized.

Operating lesson

Keep credential authority tied to the destinations the administrator approved.

Evidence and limits

The public PR dates to October 17. Tagged verification: Vertex project and region fields and their aliases are constrained by deployment-aware client-parameter validation. Existing administrator opt-ins and caller-supplied-credential modes are deliberate exceptions.

Sources