Disclosed weakness · no CVE recorded

LiteLLM client metadata could hide tool names from policy checks

LiteLLM · LiteLLM Proxy · tool_policy guardrail

First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint

Summary

Messages requests containing client metadata could bypass blocks on long tool names or provider-native tools.

Severity and exploitation evidence

No CVSS score recorded in this review.

Exploitation not established: The reviewed sources describe a correction or controlled reproduction; malicious exploitation against users is not established.

Exploitation evidence source

Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.

How the weakness works

Client metadata was preferred over proxy route metadata, hiding the route needed to extract request-body tool names.

Conditions required

The tool_policy guardrail is enabled; a /v1/messages request supplies client metadata and a blocked name requiring route-specific extraction.

Potential impact

Blocked tools can reach the model and, in the maintainer’s Claude Code demonstration, be called.

Affected versions and configurations

The report demonstrates the issue on its LTS and main snapshots. The route-lookup defect remains in tagged 1.108.12 and 1.110.1; the complete earlier range is unspecified.

Fix and mitigation status

No corrected release is verified. The problematic route lookup remains in 1.108.12 and 1.110.1.

Practical next steps

Restrict affected Messages requests or apply and verify a route-metadata correction before relying on these blocks. Test both full tool names and client metadata.

Operating lesson

Security decisions must use trusted request context rather than caller-supplied metadata.

Evidence and limits

The November 19 backport PR explicitly records the remaining metadata gap after the long-name repair. It reports live multi-worker checks against real providers and a Claude Code run. Both reviewed stable tags retain metadata-first fallback. This is the tool_policy plugin, distinct from the previously indexed tool_permission request-shape correction; no full earlier affected range or CVE is established.

Sources