Disclosed weakness · no CVE recorded

LiteLLM alternate file identifiers could bypass team ownership checks

LiteLLM · LiteLLM Proxy · managed provider files

First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint

Summary

A caller could reach another team’s registered provider file by spelling its identifier differently.

Severity and exploitation evidence

No CVSS score recorded in this review.

Exploitation not established: The reviewed sources describe a correction or controlled reproduction; malicious exploitation against users is not established.

Exploitation evidence source

Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.

How the weakness works

Exact-string ownership lookup failed to recognize encoded, prefixed or URL forms that the provider resolves to the same file.

Conditions required

A caller has a proxy key and knows a provider file identifier; managed-file ownership rows and shared provider access are in use.

Potential impact

Unauthorized access to batch output or other provider file content.

Affected versions and configurations

The reviewed sources do not establish a complete affected-release range.

Fix and mitigation status

1.109.2 contains the correction. The first corrected build on every release line is unverified.

Practical next steps

Deploy a build with canonical ownership lookup and verify ownership records for older outputs before enabling shared provider-file reads.

Operating lesson

Normalize resource identifiers before authorization and bind every provider resource to an owner.

Evidence and limits

The original correction is public November 13; its linked feature PR is earlier but does not independently date this specific finding. Tagged source checks every recognized spelling before can_access_resource. Files with no ownership row intentionally remain accessible; this fix does not secure unregistered outputs.

Sources