Disclosed weakness · no CVE recorded
LiteLLM Gemini pass-through could bypass file ownership
LiteLLM · LiteLLM Proxy · Gemini pass-through
First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint
Summary
A virtual key with pass-through access could read another user’s file metadata or delete the file through the Gemini route.
Severity and exploitation evidence
Medium · numeric CVSS score not recorded. Severity source.
Exploitation not established: Reviewed maintainer reports and controlled checks do not establish malicious exploitation against users.
Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.
How the weakness works
The pass-through omitted the managed-file ownership check. Its first correction still missed repeatedly encoded dot segments and backslash paths.
Conditions required
The caller has a valid virtual key with Gemini pass-through access and targets a file uploaded through the managed files API.
Potential impact
Cross-user file metadata disclosure and deletion were demonstrated against Gemini. Content download succeeded against a local stand-in; the real-provider download attempt returned 400.
Affected versions and configurations
The complete earlier range is unspecified. Reviewed stable 1.108.15 and 1.110.2 tags lack the Gemini ownership guard.
Fix and mitigation status
1.112.0-dev.2 contains both PR53171 and follow-up PR53210 and is a prerelease. No corrected stable release was verified.
Practical next steps
Restrict Gemini pass-through access or apply and verify the complete ownership and path-normalization correction. Do not rely on the first correction alone.
Operating lesson
Authorize the normalized resource identity on every route to the same object.
Evidence and limits
The maintainer rates the issue Medium without a published CVSS score. Public PRs are November 20; the development release is November 21. Controlled checks used a one-worker proxy and both real Gemini and a local stand-in. File listing still exposes metadata, and files without ownership records remain accessible as before. Provider redirects remain followed, and other pass-through routes were not audited by the follow-up. These limitations prevent a general file-isolation or version-safety claim.
Sources
- Original Gemini ownership correction and controlled evidence
Primary source ·
- Encoded-path and backslash follow-up
Primary source ·
- LiteLLM development release 1.112.0-dev.2
Primary source ·
- Development tag Gemini ownership and normalization
Primary source ·