Disclosed weakness · no CVE recorded
LiteLLM alternate fal paths could bypass the configured price gate
LiteLLM · LiteLLM Proxy · fal.ai pass-through
First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint
Summary
A caller could submit an unpriceable fal job using the gateway’s provider key.
Severity and exploitation evidence
No CVSS score recorded in this review.
Exploitation not established: The reviewed sources describe a correction or controlled reproduction; malicious exploitation against users is not established.
Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.
How the weakness works
The price gate inspected the supplied path while the upstream request used a normalized path, allowing a submission to look like an exempt result poll.
Conditions required
A caller is authorized to use /fal_ai and the proxy has fal credentials.
Potential impact
Provider costs could be incurred for requests the gateway could not price or intended to refuse.
Affected versions and configurations
The reviewed sources do not establish a complete affected-release range.
Fix and mitigation status
1.109.2 contains the correction; other release lines were not independently established.
Practical next steps
Update to a build with the upstream-path check and restrict pass-through submissions until pricing enforcement is verified.
Operating lesson
Apply authorization and billing gates to the exact destination that will execute.
Evidence and limits
Original PR November 13; merged November 15; included in stable 1.109.2 November 19. Tagged code uses the same normalized upstream path for poll classification and pricing. The maintainer’s demonstration used a local stand-in, not the live fal service.
Sources
- fix(proxy): run the /fal_ai passthrough price gate on the path sent upstream
Primary source ·
- v1.109.2 release notes
Primary source ·
- LiteLLM 1.109.2 fal upstream-path price check
Primary source ·