Disclosed weakness · no CVE recorded
Dify OAuth proxy contexts could be consumed twice during concurrent callbacks
Dify · Dify · Trigger, Tool Provider and Datasource OAuth
First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint
Summary
Concurrent consumers could both obtain an OAuth context intended for single use.
Severity and exploitation evidence
No CVSS score recorded in this review.
Exploitation not established: The reviewed sources describe a correction or controlled reproduction; malicious exploitation against users is not established.
Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.
How the weakness works
The shared service read and deleted the Redis context in separate operations.
Conditions required
Two consumers race for the same valid context identifier before either deletion completes.
Potential impact
The same authorization context could be reused; account takeover or successful duplicate credential issuance was not demonstrated in the public report.
Affected versions and configurations
The reviewed upstream report does not establish a complete affected-release range.
Fix and mitigation status
1.20.0 contains the correction.
Practical next steps
Upgrade to 1.20.0 and preserve the required Redis compatibility for atomic context consumption.
Operating lesson
Consume one-time authorization state atomically.
Evidence and limits
The PR was public two minutes before its linked issue on November 10. The reproduced race used real Redis at service level; a full HTTP OAuth callback was not tested. Tagged verification: the service uses Redis GETDEL to consume context atomically.
Sources
- fix: consume OAuth proxy contexts atomically
Primary source ·
- OAuth proxy context can be consumed more than once concurrently
Primary source ·
- 1.20.0 release notes
Primary source ·
- Dify 1.20.0 atomic OAuth context consumption
Primary source ·