Disclosed weakness · no CVE recorded

Dify OAuth proxy contexts could be consumed twice during concurrent callbacks

Dify · Dify · Trigger, Tool Provider and Datasource OAuth

First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint

Summary

Concurrent consumers could both obtain an OAuth context intended for single use.

Severity and exploitation evidence

No CVSS score recorded in this review.

Exploitation not established: The reviewed sources describe a correction or controlled reproduction; malicious exploitation against users is not established.

Exploitation evidence source

Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.

How the weakness works

The shared service read and deleted the Redis context in separate operations.

Conditions required

Two consumers race for the same valid context identifier before either deletion completes.

Potential impact

The same authorization context could be reused; account takeover or successful duplicate credential issuance was not demonstrated in the public report.

Affected versions and configurations

The reviewed upstream report does not establish a complete affected-release range.

Fix and mitigation status

1.20.0 contains the correction.

Practical next steps

Upgrade to 1.20.0 and preserve the required Redis compatibility for atomic context consumption.

Operating lesson

Consume one-time authorization state atomically.

Evidence and limits

The PR was public two minutes before its linked issue on November 10. The reproduced race used real Redis at service level; a full HTTP OAuth callback was not tested. Tagged verification: the service uses Redis GETDEL to consume context atomically.

Sources