Disclosed weakness · no CVE recorded
Dify file-link renewal could issue a new signature without validating the original
Dify · Dify · signed file URL renewal
First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint
Summary
The file-link renewal path did not consistently establish that the original URL carried an authentic signature.
Severity and exploitation evidence
No CVSS score recorded in this review.
Exploitation not established: The reviewed sources describe a correction or controlled reproduction; malicious exploitation against users is not established.
Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.
How the weakness works
Renewal generated a replacement before validating the original HMAC.
Conditions required
An unsigned or tampered file link reaches the renewal path; the public report does not establish a complete remote attack route.
Potential impact
A replacement link could grant file access without an authenticated original link.
Affected versions and configurations
The reviewed upstream report does not establish a complete affected-release range.
Fix and mitigation status
1.20.0 contains the correction.
Practical next steps
Upgrade to 1.20.0. Expect links signed before a SECRET_KEY rotation to remain nonrenewable under the new key.
Operating lesson
Verify the authority of an expiring capability before issuing its replacement.
Evidence and limits
The public source withholds the original exploit report. Tagged verification: renewal computes the expected HMAC, compares the original signature, and returns the unchanged URL when validation fails.
Sources
- fix(api): harden file previews and signed URL renewal
Primary source ·
- 1.20.0 release notes
Primary source ·
- Dify 1.20.0 file-link renewal validation
Primary source ·