Disclosed weakness · no CVE recorded

Dify could misidentify clients and fail to enforce per-IP limits

LangGenius · Dify · API and bundled reverse proxy

First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint

Summary

Dify used an unverified client address for per-IP throttling and login-failure records. The maintainer confirmed the issue on the default Docker deployment.

Severity and exploitation evidence

Medium · 6.5/10 · CVSS 3.1. Severity source.

Exploitation not established: The advisory describes a controlled demonstration on 1.17.1. The reviewed sources identify no malicious use.

Exploitation evidence source

Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.

How the weakness works

The application accepted client-address metadata without establishing that a trusted intermediary had supplied it.

Conditions required

An unauthenticated caller can reach an affected endpoint on a deployment that accepts untrusted client-address metadata.

Potential impact

Password-reset email volume could exceed the per-IP limit, and recorded source addresses could be unreliable. Reset-code verification retained its separate account-level control.

Affected versions and configurations

Through 1.17.1, according to the maintainer.

Fix and mitigation status

1.18.0.

Practical next steps

Upgrade to 1.18.0 or a later fixed release. Restrict direct API access to trusted callers and configure address verification at each trusted ingress proxy.

Operating lesson

Use the same verified client address for abuse controls and audit records. Verify that distinct clients still receive distinct rate-limit buckets behind your load balancer.

Evidence and limits

The public October 12 patch documents the trust correction. Version 1.18.0 shipped October 23. The November 14 advisory supplies the affected range and CVSS score and lists no CVE.

Sources