CVE-2026-77313

Flyto HTTP requests could re-resolve a checked host to an internal address

flytohub · Flyto2 Core · agent workflow runtime

First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint

Summary

A DNS answer change could bypass the outbound-request guard.

Severity and exploitation evidence

High · 7.1/10 · CVSS 3.1. Severity source.

Exploitation not established: Reviewed public sources describe the weakness, a correction or a controlled demonstration; malicious exploitation against users is not established.

Exploitation evidence source

Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.

How the weakness works

The guard validates one DNS response, then http.get connects after an independent lookup.

Conditions required

A caller controls a hostname’s DNS and wins a timing-dependent answer change.

Potential impact

Readable requests to internal or metadata services.

Affected versions and configurations

Before 2.26.8.

Fix and mitigation status

2.26.8.

Practical next steps

Upgrade to 2.26.8 and verify the applicable path or outbound-network controls.

Operating lesson

Validate the exact address used by the connection.

Evidence and limits

The two separately assigned DNS CVEs 77313 and 77316 describe overlapping manifestations of the same resolve-then-connect gap and share correction bf748df; they are not evidence of two independent exploit primitives. Original July 11 advisory predates November 19 CNA ingestion. Reviewed correction and 2.26.8 tagged utilities establish the guarded resolver; public demonstrations are not malicious exploitation. CNA publication is 2026-11-19; this is distinct from the earliest reviewed public source and correction dates. GitHub_M assessments: CVSS 3.1 7.1.

Sources