CVE-2026-77313
Flyto HTTP requests could re-resolve a checked host to an internal address
flytohub · Flyto2 Core · agent workflow runtime
First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint
Summary
A DNS answer change could bypass the outbound-request guard.
Severity and exploitation evidence
High · 7.1/10 · CVSS 3.1. Severity source.
Exploitation not established: Reviewed public sources describe the weakness, a correction or a controlled demonstration; malicious exploitation against users is not established.
Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.
How the weakness works
The guard validates one DNS response, then http.get connects after an independent lookup.
Conditions required
A caller controls a hostname’s DNS and wins a timing-dependent answer change.
Potential impact
Readable requests to internal or metadata services.
Affected versions and configurations
Before 2.26.8.
Fix and mitigation status
2.26.8.
Practical next steps
Upgrade to 2.26.8 and verify the applicable path or outbound-network controls.
Operating lesson
Validate the exact address used by the connection.
Evidence and limits
The two separately assigned DNS CVEs 77313 and 77316 describe overlapping manifestations of the same resolve-then-connect gap and share correction bf748df; they are not evidence of two independent exploit primitives. Original July 11 advisory predates November 19 CNA ingestion. Reviewed correction and 2.26.8 tagged utilities establish the guarded resolver; public demonstrations are not malicious exploitation. CNA publication is 2026-11-19; this is distinct from the earliest reviewed public source and correction dates. GitHub_M assessments: CVSS 3.1 7.1.
Sources
- GitHub_M CVE authority record
Primary source ·
- Original Flyto advisory
Primary source ·