CVE-2026-121927

RAGFlow’s Seafile connector can send requests to an untrusted destination

InfiniFlow · RAGFlow Python Seafile connector

First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint

Summary

The connector can send a request from the server to a base URL supplied in its configuration.

Severity and exploitation evidence

Medium · 5.3/10 · CVSS 4.0. Severity source.

Exploitation not established: VulDB reports that exploit information is public. The sources reviewed do not establish malicious exploitation, unauthenticated reachability or access to a particular internal service.

Exploitation evidence source

Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.

How the weakness works

The Python account lookup appends a Seafile API path to seafile_url and sends the request with account headers. The shown helper does not validate the destination.

Conditions required

A caller can influence the connector configuration and trigger a connection from a deployment with network access to the destination.

Potential impact

The service can contact an internal or attacker-controlled host. Exposure depends on network reach, supplied credentials and response handling.

Affected versions and configurations

VulDB lists versions through 0.27.3. The Python helper was checked at that tag.

Fix and mitigation status

No fix for this exact Python connector was verified. Separate Go connector changes do not establish a fix in the deployed Python path.

Practical next steps

Restrict connector configuration to trusted users. Allowlist Seafile destinations and constrain outbound access, including redirect targets.

Operating lesson

Validate the destination at connection time, including during a connector test that uses saved credentials.

Evidence and limits

November 4 is VulDB’s advisory date. The Python source supports the request mechanism. The standalone VulDB report was access-limited.

Sources