CVE-2026-120233
AG-UI redirects can forward agent request data and custom headers
AG-UI Protocol · @ag-ui/client HttpAgent
First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint
Summary
A malicious or compromised agent endpoint can redirect a credential-bearing run request to another origin.
Severity and exploitation evidence
Medium · 6.9/10 · CVSS 4.0. Severity source.
Exploitation not established: Controlled research or code-path evidence; the reviewed sources do not establish malicious exploitation or a confirmed victim.
Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.
How the weakness works
The default fetch initialization omits a redirect policy, so it follows server-chosen redirects without pinning the agent origin.
Conditions required
The client sends a run request to an endpoint controlled or compromised by an attacker. Exposure depends on the headers, runtime and redirect behavior.
Potential impact
The Node24 demonstration forwarded the request envelope and X-Tenant header but stripped cross-origin Authorization and did not carry the test message secret. Full conversation-body forwarding on 307/308 is a researcher claim based on browser fetch behavior, not that measured result.
Affected versions and configurations
CNA lists ag-ui 0.0.1 through 0.0.58; the researcher tested @ag-ui/client 0.0.58.
Fix and mitigation status
No released fix verified. PR #2575 proposing redirect:error remains open and unmerged on November 1.
Practical next steps
Reject redirects for credential-bearing agent requests or use an origin-pinned transport; review custom fetch overrides separately and limit outbound destinations.
Operating lesson
An agent endpoint must not be allowed to choose where client credentials and conversation data are sent.
Evidence and limits
Public report August 25; proposed fix August 30; CVE November 1. CNA assigns Medium 6.9 CVSS 4.0 (also 5.3 CVSS 3.1). Public proof-of-concept availability is not evidence of malicious exploitation. Proposed default-request fix would not cover developer-supplied fetch overrides.
Sources
- Original report with measured limits
Primary source ·
- Open proposed fix
Primary source ·
- Published CNA record and attributed CVSS score
Primary source ·