CVE-2026-105697
Langflow MCP execution paths accept tenant-controlled host commands
langflow-ai · Langflow MCP stdio transport
First documented disclosure · Review checkpoint
Summary
MCP server settings and embedded flow configurations can launch unauthorized commands as the Langflow service account.
Severity and exploitation evidence
Critical · 9.9/10 · CVSS 3.1. Severity source.
Exploitation not established: The reviewed primary sources establish a vulnerability and controlled reproduction, not real-world malicious exploitation. CISA KEV 2026.10.27 contains no exact-ID match; absence is not proof of no exploitation.
Technical severity is not a measure of observed attacks or of risk to your deployment. Attempts, demonstrations, and successful compromise retain the qualifications in the source.
How the weakness works
Unrestricted stdio commands and a shell wrapper allowed execution before MCP startup; an API-only fix left flow/tweak and final-spawn paths exposed.
Conditions required
Access to MCP configuration or an executable flow; default development AUTO_LOGIN can provide a token without credentials, while hardened login requires an authenticated non-admin user.
Potential impact
Host command execution with the Langflow process’s access to secrets, files and connected services.
Affected versions and configurations
Langflow >=1.1.2,<1.10.3; langflow-base >=0.1.2,<0.10.3; lfx <1.10.3.
Fix and mitigation status
Langflow/lfx 1.10.3 and langflow-base 0.10.3. Version 1.9.0 fixes only the REST settings path.
Practical next steps
Upgrade all relevant packages; disable AUTO_LOGIN, restrict users and executable packages, and apply documented interpreter/Docker hardening.
Operating lesson
Validate executable connector configuration again where the process is launched.
Evidence and limits
March23 public REST-fix PR precedes July13 broader execution-fix PR, September28 advisory and October5 CVE. It overlaps the REST vector in105740 but has a separate CVE and broader fix boundary; 105740 sensor attempts are not automatically evidence for this ID.
Sources
- Original public MCP command-injection fix discussion
Primary source ·
- Broader execution-boundary fix discussion
Primary source ·
- Maintainer advisory for this exact CVE
Primary source ·
- Langflow1.10.3 fixed release
Primary source ·
- GitHub_M CNA record
Primary source ·